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Abstract—Authorship analysis on phishing websites enables
the investigation of phishing attacks, beyond basic analysis. In
authorship analysis, salient features from documents are used to
determine properties about the author, such as which of a set
of candidate authors wrote a given document. In unsupervised
authorship analysis, the aim is to group documents such that
all documents by one author are grouped together. Applying
this to cyber-attacks shows the size and scope of attacks from
specific groups. This in turn allows investigators to focus their
attention on specific attacking groups rather than trying to
profile multiple independent attackers. In this paper, we analyse
phishing websites using the current state of the art unsupervised
authorship analysis method, called NUANCE. The results indicate
that the application produces clusters which correlate strongly
to authorship, evaluated using expert knowledge and external
information as well as showing an improvement over a previous
approach with known flaws.
I. INTRODUCTION
Phishing is a type of attack in which a target institution is
mimicked to defraud a victim, falling under the category of
‘information gathering through apparently authentic appeals’
[25]. In an online service phishing attack, information such
as usernames and passwords can be obtained by creating a
website that mimics the trusted party’s legitimate website,
called a phishing website. The Anti-Phishing Working Group
reports that more than thirty thousand phishing websites were
detected each month in the second quarter of 2010 [3].
Identifying information, such as online banking passwords or
driver’s license numbers, can then be used to access money,
obtain financial loans or register for services (such as a mobile
phone or car hire) in a victims name. An identity theft such
as this has been shown to have a large negative impact on
the victim, with the victim recovery process proving difficult,
costly and traumatic [27], [23].
Despite advances in anti-phishing technologies and increas-
ing public awareness, phishing attacks continue to cause exten-
sive damage. The French Ministry of Finance was infiltrated
by a targeted phishing attack, called spear phishing, in March
of 2011 [4] leaking information relating to a G-20 economic
group to attackers who remain unidentified. In February of
2011, the Canadian Government was forced to restrict web
access to their online services due to a large number of targeted
phishing attacks [5]. Email accounts originally compromised
by the phishing attack were then used to spread a virus to other
parts of the compromised network, leading to a greater level of
penetration. Personal and private information can also be lost
or leaked on a large scale through unintentional mistakes or
ignorance [30] however the focus of this paper is on intentional
acts, rather than these accidental losses.
The objective of this research is to analyse a set of phishing
websites to determine the size and scope of the operations
creating them. In order to perform this, a methodology able
to perform automated and unsupervised authorship analysis
was used, called NUANCE (n-gram Unsupervised Automated
Natural Cluster Ensemble). This research publishes results
that are currently in use in industry to assist with phishing
response. This analysis could be applied to other cybercrimes
involving written documents such as fraud detection and
plagiarism investigation.
II. AUTHORSHIP ANALYSIS IN CYBERCRIME
Cybercrime is difficult to investigate for a number of
reasons, with one of those being the lack of appropriate models
for determining the provenance of attacks. In order for this to
be achieved, attacks need to be linked together in a reliable
and robust method. One method for linking documents by
provenance is Authorship Analysis, described as ‘the process
of examining the characteristics of a piece of work in order
to draw conclusions on its authorship’ [31, p.60], normally
concerned with discovering who wrote a particular document.
For cyberattacks consisting of written documents, such as
phishing, authorship analysis could lead to insights into the
attack’s provenance.
Cybercrime is an important application of authorship analy-
sis due to its increasing impact on today’s lifestyle. The nature
of the Internet provides an easy way to maintain anonymity
while still allowing Internet based crime to gain large results,
creating a need for indirect methods of attack attribution. The
types of cybercrimes that authorship analysis has been applied
to vary wildly. Examples include webpage spam [29], [28],
malware [11], [9], pornography [21], online terrorism postings
[1],web forum postings [24] and malware code [17], [16], [12].
A. Local n-grams Profiling
Local n-grams (LNG) methodologies are effective forms of
authorship analysis that are language independent, automatable
           
and highly accurate. LNG is based on a concept of an ‘author
profile’, which is ‘the set of the L most frequent n-grams with
their normalised frequencies’ [15], for a given author. From
these author profiles, several methods in the literature exist for
determining the distance between two profiles for authors A1
and A2.
The original method of this type is the Common n-grams
(CNG) method [15]. The CNG method uses the Relative Dis-
tance (RD) between two document profiles or author profiles
with lower distances considered to infer that two profiles
are from the same author. The frequencies for the L most
frequently occurring n-grams are compared using equation 1,
to determine a distance between the two profiles [15].
K =
∑
x∈XP1∪XP2
(
2 · (P1(x)− P2(x))
P1(x) + P2(x)
)2
(1)
Where Pi(x) is the frequency of term x in profile Pi and XPi
is the set of all n-grams occurring in profile Pi.
Other Local n-gram methodologies for authorship analysis
include the Source Code Author Profiling (SCAP) method [9],
[10], the Recentred Local Profiles (RLP) method [20] and
the Weighted Profile Intersection (WPI) method [7]. Each of
these other methods employ a similar methodology to CNG
with variations in the way in which profiles are generated and
distances between profiles are calculated.
B. Unsupervised Authorship Analysis
The above listed methods are all supervised methods for
authorship analysis. Without labelled corpora for discovering
models, these methods cannot be applied to discover the
authorship of phishing webpages and other cybercrimes. For
this reason, unsupervised methods of authorship analysis are
needed. There has been a traditional lack of research in
the field of unsupervised authorship analysis, although recent
research is working to resolve this gap in the literature. Juola
surveyed the field of authorship attribution and listed only
visualisation techniques for unsupervised authorship attribu-
tion [14]. Other survey papers of the field also failed to list
any unsupervised authorship analysis methods that are not
visualisation methods [26].
Since those listed survey papers, there has been some
research on the field. Research by [13] performs a clustering
of emails by authorship. Once this clustering is performed,
the resulting clusters are then analysed using the Writeprints
[2] technique used earlier to discover patterns that lead to
the creation of the cluster. The clustering algorithms chosen
require an estimate of the number of clusters, which was
chosen in these experiments as the number of authors in the
dataset - the ‘correct’ value of k. This is not practical for a real
world application, where the correct value cannot be known
a-priori.
[29], [28] use similarity detection focusing on mainly the
non-alphanumeric characters in HTML source code to detect
clusters of spam campaigns that were generated by the same
automated process. The methods do not attempt to cluster by
authorship, instead focusing on campaigns of spam - those
generated by the same generation software but not necessarily
all spam by the same author.
The USCAP methodology by [19] is an automated method-
ology for clustering documents and was performed on a set
of phishing websites. This technique uses the SCAP method-
ology, a form of LNG using just the occurrence rather than
the frequencies of n-grams, on document profiles and then
clusters using SCAP’s distance metric. The results showed a
high precision but low recall; while there was evidence that
the websites within each cluster ‘belonged’ together, there was
substantial evidence found that the discovered clusters should
be linked. This led to the conclusion that the discovered clus-
ters represented campaigns of attacks, rather than authorship
itself. In this research, the results of USCAP will be used as
the baseline research for improvement.
The n-gram Unsupervised Automated Natural Cluster En-
semble (NUANCE) methodology proposed in [18] enables
the clustering of documents by authorship and was shown to
produce clusters with a high correlation to true authorship.
The NUANCE methodology takes as input a set of documents
and creates local n-gram profiles of each document to form
an array of representations of the data. Each representation is
then clustered multiple times using the k-means algorithm with
randomised initialisation parameters. The resulting clusters
are used to form a co-association matrix C such that Ci,j
is the number of times that instances i and j are clustered
together. The resulting matrix C is then used to form a
dendrogram, which is then cut using the Iterative Positive
Silhoeutte (IPS) procedure, which cuts the dendrogram into
k clusters where k − 1 clusters results in a negative median
Silhouette Coefficient.
III. TESTING METHODOLOGY
The NUANCE methodology was applied to a dataset of
phishing websites described in subsection III-A. The resulting
clusters were then evaluated using a number of methods based
on external information validating the clustering results. The
evaluations are described in section IV.
The methodology in [18] used a large number of parameters
and each of the three local n-gram methods described earlier
(CNG, SCAP and RLP). However, the results of a leave-
one-out ensemble consistently chose the CNG method with
the following parameters for each of the different authorship
problems in [18], which are n = 3, L = 3000; n = 4,
L = 5000; n = 4, L = 7500; n = 5, L = 7500; and
n = 5, L = 10000. Due to the stability of the choice of these
parameters, they were chosen for the ensemble in this appli-
cation. The application area of this research is of a different
nature than the corpora used to select these parameters, as the
HTML is much more formalised that the written documents
used in the initial NUANCE training and contains many more
punctuation characters. However both sets are in English and
previous work using Local n-grams suggests similar n values,
at least for classification performance. As an example, the
work of [8] on programming source code (specifically C++
and Java) shows high accuracy for n ≥ 3 with high L values,
overlapping significantly with the parameter choices used here.
A. Testing Dataset
The dataset used for this experiment is a set of over 800
phishing websites targeting a major Australian financial in-
stitution. The phishing websites were collected between 2007
and 2011 by a monitoring system. The monitoring system used
automated methods to collect phishing emails and discovery
phishing websites from them. The URL is accessed and the
resulting webpage verified as phishing by a human expert,
ensuring little noise in the dataset.
IV. EVALUATION METHODS
The evaluation of the application of unsupervised methods is
always a difficult task, as ground truth does not exist to provide
fully independent feedback on the effectiveness of the result.
To compensate for this, we use four independent methods of
evaluation to assert quality. The first evaluation criteria is the
site validation score, ensuring that likely matches by URL are
within the same cluster. The second is the use of URL based
rules to determine the purity of each cluster, called the URL
pattern score. The third asserts that the clusters found through
an application of USCAP, which was found to find phishing
campaigns, form a subset of the clusters found by NUANCE.
The fourth is an evaluation based on an expert’s labelling of
a sample of the websites. The results of the first, second and
fourth evaluation methods will be compared against the results
obtained from applying USCAP, under the expectation that
NUANCE performs better in all cases.
A. URL Domain Evaluation
The URL validation criteria makes an assumption that if
two phishing websites are hosted on the same URL, then they
are likely to be created by the same author. This assumption is
not a perfect one; a trivial counter-example would be the use
of a URL as a free hosting platform, which is leveraged by
different phishing groups. However it is considered likely that
the assumption would hold true in most cases. This assumption
has been used in previous phishing clustering research [19].
The site validation score is measured as the percentage of
times that two phishing websites hosted on the same URL are
clustered together. A value close to 1.0 is considered indicative
of clusters with a high precision, while a low value would
indicate incorrect clusters.
B. URL Based Rules
URL patterns are used by industry experts to determine
which phishing group attacks come from, and are considered
to be fairly accurate for some groups. A URL pattern is
constructed based on observations by an expert to indicate that
a phishing attack probably belongs to a known group. Different
groups use different URL patterns themselves - a group could
use more than one pattern. For this reason, it is considered that
an authorship cluster should contain all phishing attacks hosted
on URLs following a pattern. However it is not expected that
all phishing attacks in an authorship cluster follow a URL
pattern. The URL pattern score is therefore defined as the
purity of the attacks matching a known URL pattern.
The full list of URL patterns used in this research is
considered a trade secret and cannot be published, however
it was created with the help of a cybercrime expert and is
considered accurate based on their experience. Three examples
of the URL patterns are given below.:
• Matches the pattern: http://%/%<BANKING_DOMAIN>/%
1
• Contains the phrase: %.user% 2
• Contains the phrase: %_email=%3
The evaluation score for the URL patterns is calculated
as the mean purity of the labels for each URL pattern. The
concept of purity asserts that members of one class appear
predominately within another class [6] and is related to the
concept of precision. It is often used as a supervised metric,
in which the predicted classes are asserted to be subsets of
actual classes, or vice versa. The purity for a class O1i for
class O2j is the proportion of instances in O
1
i that are within
the comparison cluster O2j . The classes (or clusters) O
1
i and
O2j (for any value of j) are often from a differing clustering
or partitioning of a dataset. The purity for a class O1i for class
O2j is given the notation purity(O
1
i , O
2
j ) and calculated using
equation 2, where n is the number of instances in the dataset.
purity(O1i , O
2
j ) =
1
n
(|O1i ∩O2j |) (2)
The purity for a class O1i is the maximum value of the above
metric for all possible other classes O2j . Formally, the purity
for class O1i is given as purity(O
1
i ) and calculated using
equation 3.
purity(O1i ) = max
j
purity(O1i , O
2
j ) (3)
The purity for a set of classes O1 = {O11, ...O1i , ...O1k} of a
dataset is given as the mean of the purity for each class (or
cluster) in O1.
C. USCAP Sub-cluster Purity
The clusters obtained by the USCAP methodology were
shown to have a high precision but a low recall [19]. The
instances in each cluster were likely to have belonged to a
single author but there was evidence that clusters should be
joined. The USCAP clusters can then be used as a further
purity based evaluation of the NUANCE clusters.
The USCAP purity is therefore measured using a method
similar to the URL pattern score. For each USCAP cluster
KU , the NUANCE cluster KN containing the most instances
from KU is noted as the ‘expected cluster’. The percentage of
instances from KU in KN is given as the USCAP purity score.
1Indicating that the phishing kit targets many websites, or that it is trying
to fool the user by including the domain in the folders list. The percentage
sign (%) is a wildcard matching none or many characters.
2A pattern previously used by rock-phish.
3This phrase is usually followed by an email identifier, which can be used
to verify and track email addresses caught by the phishing attacks.
Values closer to 1 indicate that the entire USCAP cluster is
contained within a NUANCE cluster, suggesting further that
the NUANCE clusters are of a high precision.
D. Expert Evaluation
A team of cybercrime experts were used to evaluate the
resulting clusters, by providing their own labelling on a sample
of the phishing webpages. The experts are part of a commercial
security team with a large amount of experience in cybercrime
investigation, including phishing attacks. The labels provided
by the experts were their evaluation of which phishing kit was
behind the attack. Different phishing kits likely share the same
author. As a result, the labels provided by the experts should
form subsets of the clusters found by NUANCE. A sample was
chosen of 30.6% of the websites, of which the expert team was
able to identify the phishing kit behind 52% of these attacks.
This sample size corresponded to a 95% confidence of 5%
error rate on the websites in the population, however not all
of the attacks within the sample were able to be identified.
The purity measure was calculated for the labels with values
close to 1 indicating that the phishing kit labels belong within
the NUANCE clusters, which was the expected scenario.
Stratified sampling was used, taking a proportional sample
from each cluster, which was chosen to ensure that most
clusters were represented. Any cluster with three or fewer
documents was ignored in the sample (as the expected sample
size is less than 1), while all larger cluster have a proportionate
amount.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The application of the automatic and unsupervised author-
ship analysis methodology to the phishing webpage dataset
resulted in 21 clusters being found. Seven clusters had just
one member, with another eight clusters having less than ten
members. The largest cluster contained 75.4% of all of the
phishing webpages while the next largest cluster contained
10.6% of entries.
A. Site Validation Score
The site validation score was significantly higher for NU-
ANCE than was achieved for USCAP when applied to the
phishing websites. The site validation score was 0.979 indi-
cating that when two phishing webpages were hosted on the
same domain, 97.9% of the time they were clustered together.
There were 285 joint uses of URLs with 6 URLs appearing
in multiple clusters. Three of the errors occurred due to URLs
appearing in both clusters 7 and 15. The other three appeared
in KN0 (NUANCE cluster numbered 0), with each URL also
appearing in clusters KN1 , K
N
5 and K
N
20.
In contrast, the USCAP methodology scored just 0.902. The
USCAP methodology made 26 errors from 266 decisions a
significant increase on a smaller decision set. In the original
USCAP results, 12 errors came from overlap between clusters
KU8 and K
U
9 (USCAP clusters 8 and 9). Both of these clusters
are subsets of cluster KN0 , strongly supporting the conclusion
that these two clusters be merged. The increase in the site
validation score also suggests strong evidence showing that
NUANCE provides clusters with a higher precision than those
obtained by USCAP.
B. URL Pattern Score
The URL pattern score was also high with a score of
0.970, indicating that the attacks corresponding to each of
the known cluster patterns were in the same cluster for an
average of 97% of the time. Of the 21 URL patterns used in
the evaluation, 14 had a perfect purity of 1.0 which indicated
that all phishing attacks matching a URL pattern appeared in
the same NUANCE cluster. Four of the patterns had a purity
above 0.9, indicating that 90% of the attacks fell within the
same cluster, while the remaining three patterns had purity
scores above 0.8.
Three URL patterns had significant overlap between clusters
with more than 3 attacks appearing in the non-dominate
cluster. All three of the URL patterns were variants of
BANK_DOMAIN, suggesting that these rules may not be accu-
rate. One of these patterns linked KN0 and K
N
1 using the main
banking domain. Another URL pattern linked clusters KN0 and
KN15 using the full online banking domain path (including sub-
domain). The final pattern with errors linked KN0 and K
N
15
again using the banking domain as a folder name.
The USCAP results scored 0.861 for the URL pattern
scores, representing a marked improvement by NUANCE.
Again this shows a higher precision of the clusters obtained
by NUANCE compared to USCAP. In the next section, the
clusters resulting from both methodologies are compared.
C. USCAP Purity Score
The USCAP purity score was 0.945, indicating strongly
that the clusters from the application of USCAP are typically
subsets of the clusters from NUANCE. Only two USCAP
clusters were not subsets of a NUANCE cluster. The first
was USCAP cluster 7 (KU7 ), which had attacks appearing in
fourteen NUANCE clusters overall. It is worth noting that
KU7 had a poor intra-cluster distance and was similar to
other clusters, KU8 and K
U
9 . This suggests that the initial
clustering by USCAP was poor for this cluster. The second
was KU12, appearing in two NUANCE clusters. Together, these
two clusters account for 41 phishing websites. Figure 1 in the
Appendix illustrates the relationship between clusters from
NUANCE (the ‘N’ clusters) and those from USCAP (the
‘U’ clusters). In this diagram, two clusters are linked if they
jointly contain the same attacks. Clusters with full purity map
completely into another cluster, as is the case with many of
the clusters shown.
D. Expert Evaluation
The expert evaluation resulted in 16% of all phishing attacks
being labelled. There were 74 different labels, with many
attacks being the only instance of that phishing kit within the
sample. In total there were 25 labels on two or more attacks
and just six of those labels on five or more attacks. The purity
for these labels would be artificially high due to the large1107
Fig. 1. Circos diagram of the relationship between the USCAP (U) and NUANCE (N) clusters with more than 10 members. Coloured bands show the size
of overlap between the clusters labelled at either end.
number of single label instances (as each of these would have
a purity of 1.0). As a result, all clusters with just one attack
were excluded from the calculation. The resulting purity was
0.980, with just one label producing an error. The USCAP
clusters also had the same and only error.
The label that produced an error was on just two attacks,
with one attack in cluster KN2 and one attack in cluster
KN15. Examination of the source code indicates that this is
indeed an error with the NUANCE clustering and not with the
expert labelling. Both of these attacks have a similar structure,
with the structure of the HTML and CSS code (contained
within the HTML) very similar. The differences are semantic
differences within the HTML, the most notable is the change
between class names, which are of different forms. The HTML
in one attack is also formatted with more whitespace, with
all sub-elements tabulated an extra level than their parent
elements. The strictness of the formatting suggests that this
may be the result of using an automatic formatter rather than
manually performed. This indicates a potential strategy for
phishers to evade future authorship analysis. Automatically
Metric Result
Site Validation 0.979
URL Pattern 0.970
USCAP Purity 0.945
Expert Evaluation 0.980
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS USING DIFFERENT EVALUATION METRICS.
post-processing the HTML can remove stylistic choices which
may dampen the quality of future attribution. This problem is
inherent in any non-structural form of authorship analysis and
must be addressed in future research.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this research, the NUANCE methodology was applied to
a set of phishing attacks targeting a major Australian banking
institution. The results are compared against four types of
evaluation based on expert knowledge, URL patterns, site
validation and the previously used USCAP method. These
evaluations indicate strongly that the clusters found by NU-1108
ANCE do in fact correspond to actual authorship clusters.
In particular, there is a strong relationship between expert
knowledge of phishing campaigns and distinct authorship
classes. Table I summarises the results, showing consistently
high scores for each evaluation metric used.
These results also serve to help investigators in their efforts
to properly understand these attacks. In this application, the
clusters were derived automatically and then analysed to
investigate their correlation to known information about the
phishing landscape. These discoveries have already led to
benefits in monitoring, investigating and protecting against
future attacks for anti-phishing responders in industry. Know-
ing the creator of a phishing attack has allowed responders
to target their response to the specific attack before manual
investigation of the attacks takes place.
The analysis, using the NUANCE methodology, could be
applied to other cybercrimes involving written documents such
as fraud detection and plagiarism investigation. In particular,
there is a strong need for higher levels of inference to be taken
from profiling methodologies such as NUANCE. NUANCE
clusters documents by authorship, but does not infer any extra
information about them. Ethnographic investigative methods
such as that employed by [22] may have a high level of
synergy with NUANCE; NUANCE can investigate a large
number of attacks while ethnographic investigations can create
higher levels of inference, profiling those attacks and the
attackers behind them. Combining these types of approaches
could lead to in-depth focused investigations of cybercrime.
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